Greece haggles while Germany looks to a get out clause.

by | May 26, 2010 | Economic Intrigue, Politics, Strange Thoughts, Well I never.

Via Zero Hedge we have Greece looking to renegotiate some of it’s IMF agreed austerity package :

It is well-known by now that the IMF and EU have no credibility left. What, however, was not known, is that even bankrupt little Greece is now in on this secret. In the latest attempt by the veryrecipient of US and European taxpayer generosity to muscle around the bailout providers, Reuters reports that Greece is now actively trying to renegotiate the terms of its pension reform. The initial focus item: “officials said they wanted the EU and IMF to agree full pensions should be payable after 37 years of contributions instead of 40, as set out in the deal, and allow the reform to be implemented later than foreseen.” Of course, should the IMF relent and give in to this, Greece will immediately demand that all Austerity requirements are null and void as they tend to lead to such unfortunate events as stormings of parliament and possible future civil war. Furthermore, with austerity now a pan-European phenomenon, look for increasing back and forth negotiations to begin all across the PIIGS and the core, as, surprisingly, nobody in Europe is all that eager to keep working the second they hit 50 years of age. Look for a plunge in the EUR if the IMF even considers engaging in terrorist negotiations. Which of course is the plan all along.

Whilst over at FT Alphaville, an interesting piece quoting from Das Bild which appears to suggest that there are a couple of get out of jail free clauses in the Greek bail out agreement :

The German paper claims to have obtained a copy of the €80bn eurozone bailout agreement for Greece — and is “exposing” the secret clauses that let ze Germans (and others) off the hook.

  • If a country has to borrow to lend funds to Greece, and if its borrowing expenses are more than the interest rate paid by Greece, the lender can ask other eurozone states to pay the difference. If the latter refuse to pay the difference, the country could refuse to lend to Greece altogether.
  • If a constitutional court in a eurozone country, or the European Court, rules that the loan to Greece violates national or European Union law, the loan agreement for the country, or the eurozone as a whole, would be void.

The last two points are really where the contention comes in, as it looks, at first blush, like eurozone countries have just given themselves a lot of leeway to avoid das Bailout(s). A complaint, for instance, has already been filed in the German courts challenging the legal status of the move.

This is getting to be like one of those tedious old soap operas where they have run out of decent storylines and now resort to killing off the characters in ever more preposterous ways.

Unfortunately, this one will end in real tears I think.

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